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the Fourth Amendment
By Bruce Newman, Ph.D.
In a recent case, City of Indianapolis v. Edmond (99-
1030), the United States Supreme Court held that 
Indianapolis’s vehicle check point program violated the 
Fourth Amendment by allowing suspicionless searches of 
vehicles for criminal evidence.  While acknowledging that 
suspicionless searches have been held constitutional in 
certain situations, i.e., for the purpose of intercept 
illegal aliens (United States v. Martinez-Fuerte1), for the 
purpose of operating sobriety checkpoints (Michigan Dept. 
of State Police v. Sitz2), and for the purpose of conducting 
driver license and vehicle registration checks (Delaware v. 
Prouse3), the Court held that suspicionless searches would 
not be considered constitutional if the primary purpose of 
the search was to detect evidence of criminal wrongdoing.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and 
Thomas dissent. The dissent argues that there should be one 
standard for inspection roadblocks.  And that is the 
1428 U. S. 543 (1976).
2496 U. S. 444 (1990).
3440 U. S. 648 (1979).
Martinez-Fuerte, Sitz and Prouse standard.  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist argued that the roadblock was constitutional 
under the Martinez-Fuerte, Sitz, and Prouse precedents.  
According to the Chief Justice, the seizure (of the 
automobile during the search) in Edmond was “plainly 
constitutional under our jurisprudence: brief, 
standardized, discretionless…which effectively serve(s) a 
weighty state interest with only minimal intrusion on the 
privacy of their occupants.”4  In other words, with barely a 
nod (if that) to the Constitution, Rehnquist argues that 
the search follows the precedents mentioned above and 
therefore is constitutional.  He is not willing to 
differentiate between vehicle stops which have criminal 
searches as their primarily and therefore will require 
individualized suspicion, and stops for other purposes 
which will not require individualized suspicion. (the non-
law enforcement primary purpose test).  Instead, he is 
willing to allow all seizures of vehicles during roadblock 
inspections as long as the roadblocks meet the above stated 
test (brief, standardized, discretionless).  The dissent at 
least has the virtue of consistency.  He will make 
4Indianapolis v. Edmond (99-1030).  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist dissenting.  Emphasis added.
enforcement purposes subject to suspicionless seizures.  
Yet, while this does not violate the Twentieth century 
precedent, is this reasoning in keeping with the original 
understanding of the Fourth Amendment?
Justice Thomas suggests an answer.  Although Justice 
Thomas joined Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent from the 
Court’s decision, he wrote separately.  He states that he 
doubts that the Founders would have approved of the seizure 
in Edmond, or the seizures in Martinez-Fuerte, Sitz or 
Prouse for that matter:
Taken together, our decisions in…Sitz
and…Matrinez-Fuerte… stand for the proposition 
that suspicionless roadblock seizures are 
constitutionally permissible if conducted 
according to a plan that limits the discretion of 
the officers conducting the stops.  I am not 
convinced that Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte were 
correctly decided.  Indeed, I rather doubt that 
the Farmers of the constitution would have 
considered “reasonable” a program of 
indiscriminate stops of individuals not suspected 
of wrongdoing.5
Thomas is not comfortable with any of the cases in this 
line of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  And the reason he 
is not comfortable is because doubts that any of the cases 
are in keeping with the original understanding of the 
amendment.  He finds it incredulous that the Farmers of the 
5Id.  Justice Thomas dissenting.
Fourth Amendment would have approved of indiscriminate 
stops of individuals.  He states, however, that in this 
case he will vote with the dissent because the 
constitutionally of Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte was not argued 
or briefed and because the dissent’s reasoning follows the 
precedent:
Respondents did not, however, advocate the 
Overruling of Sitz and Matrinez-Fuerte, and I am 
reluctant to consider such a step without the 
benefit of briefing and argument.  For the 
reasons given by the Chief justice, I believe 
that those cases compel upholding the program at 
issue here.  I, therefore, join his opinion.6
Justice Thomas’s opinion raises, yet does not attempt to 
answer, an interesting question: would the Founders have 
opposed stops seizures on public roadways?  In this paper I 
examine the original understanding of the Fourth Amendment 
to attempt an answer to this question.  I conclude two 
things.  First, the Founders were much more concerned with 
searches of real property, often insisting, not only on 
suspicion, but also a on warrant when searches of real 
property are involved.  Secondly, while the Founders did 
not consider warrants necessary for searches and seizures 
off of real property (which for the sake of simplicity I 
6Id.
call searches in public areas) the evidence suggests 
suspicion was required.  Indeed, the Fourth Amendment was a 
direct response to the British general warrant, which did 
not require particularized individual suspicion.  This in 
turn suggests that Justice Thomas is right; the 
suspicionless searches in Sitz, Prouse and their prodigy 
are not in keeping with the original understanding of the 
Fourth Amendment.
The Colonists and Writs of Assistance
In 1696, the British Parliament passed a law allowing 
for the use of writs of assistance in the colonies. The 
writ was a form of a general warrant.  Probable cause that 
the items searched for would be found in a particular place 
was not required.  Under such a writ, officials could enter
any place, including a house or place of business, and 
search for and seize prohibited goods.  As Nelson Lasson 
puts it, “The writ empowered the officer and his deputies 
and servants to search at their will, wherever they 
suspected uncustomed goods to be, and to break open any 
receptacle or package falling under their suspecting eye.”7
7Nelson Lasson, The History and Development of the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
The particular, or specific warrants, on the other hand, of 
course require particularized probable cause.  The 
government official must go before a neutral magistrate and 
demonstrate to him that he has probable cause to find the 
goods he is looking for at the particular place he 
described.  Then the judge decides if there is probable 
cause.  If the officer has not demonstrated probable cause 
to search a particular place the judge is not supposed to 
issue the warrant.   The warrant gives the added protection 
of having a magistrate decide the legitimacy of every 
search.
The writs of assistance were most often used in the 
colonies of Massachusetts and New Hampshire, and were used 
frequently to enforce revenue and custom laws.8  A 
pernicious aspect of these writs of assistance is that they 
were not returnable after execution.  Once issued they were 
good for the life of the sovereign -- in fact, life and six 
months, not expiring until six months after the sovereign’s 
death.  Therefore, the power granted the official was 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1937), 54.
8Telford Taylor, Two Studies in Constitutional 
Interpretation (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 
1969), 35.
almost unlimited.  For the life of the sovereign the writs 
allowed the official to search wherever he suspected 
illegal goods were stored.9
James Otis first aroused the colonists against the 
writs of assistance.  And, if John Adams’s report is to be 
believed, it was he who immediately gave birth to the 
movement for American independence.  In 1760, King George 
II died, and in 1761 the writs of assistance expired.  
Sixty-three Boston merchants requested a hearing before the 
Superior court of Massachusetts on the question of renewing 
the writs.  Arguing for the merchants and against the 
writs, Otis claimed that they were "instruments of slavery 
on the one hand, and villainy on the other," and that the 
writ was "the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most 
destructive of English liberty, and the fundamental 
principles of the constitution, that ever was found in an 
English law book."10 Writs threatened liberty, he argued, 
because they violated the privileges of the home:
. . . One of the most essential branches of 
English liberty is the freedom of one's house.  A 
man's house is his castle; and while he is quiet 
he is as well guarded as a prince in his castle.   
This writ, if it should be declared legal, would 
totally annihilate this privilege.  Custom house 
9Nelson Lasson, 54.
10Schwartz, The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History, 
186.
officers may enter our houses when they please --
we are commanded to permit their entry -- their 
menial servants may enter -- may break locks, 
bars and every thing in their way -- and whether 
they break through malice or revenge, no man, no 
court can inquire -- bare suspicion without oath 
is sufficient.11
Otis's main objection was that writs of assistance 
transgress upon the right of an English subject to be left 
alone in his house as long as he is not injuring anyone 
else.  The home is the individual’s castle, his realm; 
government officials should not enter while he is peaceful.  
To allow government officials to enter whenever they 
pleased would destroy the liberty man enjoys in his home.  
It would no longer be his castle.
Otis's argument is expanded in "The Rights of the 
Colonists and a List of Infringements and Violations of 
Rights," a pamphlet issued by the town of Boston in 1772, 
and largely written by Samuel Adams.12   Adams proclaims 
that the American colonists are endowed with natural 
rights, the most important of these being the rights to 
life, liberty, and property:
Among the Natural Rights of the colonists are 
these First. a Right to Life: Secondly to 
liberty; thirdly to Property; together with the 
Right to support and defend them in the best 
11Id. 190.
12Id., 199.
manner they can13
According to Adams, the colonists possess rights not 
because they are Englishmen, but because they are human 
beings. These rights are not gifts of the government, but 
of God:
It is the greatest absurdity to suppose it in the 
power of one or any number of men at entering 
into society, to renounce their essential natural 
rights, or the means of preserving those rights 
when the great end of civil government from the 
very nature of its institution is for the 
support, protection and defense of those very 
rights: the principal of which as is before 
observed, are life, liberty and property.  If men 
through fear, fraud or mistake, should in terms 
renounce and give up any essential natural right, 
the eternal law of reason and the great end of 
society, would absolutely vacate such 
renunciation; the right to freedom being the gift 
of God almighty, it is not in the power of Man to 
alienate this gift, and voluntarily become a 
slave.14
To paraphrase the Declaration of Independence, we are 
endowed by our Creator with certain unalienable rights, 
rights that are true and eternal.  The British government 
owed the colonists the protection of their rights.  
Instead, they abused these rights.  They abused these 
natural rights through, among other things, these general 
warrants known as writs of assistance: 
13Id. 200.
14Id., 202
These Officers (revenue officers of the crown) 
are by their Commission invested with powers . . 
. to enter and go on board any Ship, Harbor, 
Creek or Haven, within limits of their 
commission; and also in the day time to go into 
any house, shop cellar, or any other place where 
any goods wares or merchandises lie concealed, or 
are suspected to lie concealed, whereof the 
customs & other duties, have not been, or shall 
not be duly paid . . . and the said house, shop, 
warehouse, cellar, and other place to search and 
survey, and all and every the boxes, trunks, 
chests and packs then and there found to break 
open.15
Again, we see the concern that general warrants allow 
government to search indiscriminately.  In this passage, 
Adams, unlike Otis, does not limit his complaint to 
invasion of the home, but argues that all property, 
including shops, warehouses and houses, should be protected 
against general warrants.  Indeed, Adams also complains of 
indiscriminate searches vehicles of transportation, in this 
case ships.  In particular interest to the situation that 
is the basis of Indianapolis v. Edmond, the general warrant 
treated the guilty and the innocent alike.  The general 
warrant assumed that one's life, liberty and property were 
gifts of the state, not natural rights.  What the state 
gave, the state could take away.
The point can be further developed by turning to James 
15Id., 205.
Wilson, one of the most important and influential political 
thinkers of late eighteenth century America.  In his 
"Lectures on Law,” Wilson explores Edmund Burke’s 
understanding of the difference between civil and natural 
liberty.  Burke argues that man can’t completely enjoy 
natural and civil rights together.  When man enters civil 
society he gives up his natural rights.16   Wilson contends 
that the implication of this view is that under government 
people surrender their natural rights in return for "civil 
privileges."17 A citizen's rights are seen as gifts of the 
government rather than gifts of God.  If this view is 
correct, Wilson says, then "man is not only made for, but 
made by the government: he is nothing but what the society 
frames, he can claim nothing but what the society 
provides."18    The purpose of good government, however, 
according to Wilson, is not the abridgment of natural 
rights, but rather the nourishment and protection of those 
natural rights, for “man's natural liberty, instead of 
being abridged, may be increased and secured in a 
government, which is good and wise.  As it is with regard 
16James Wilson, "Law Lectures" in The Works of James 
Wilson, ed. Robert Green McCloskey (Cambridge MA: Belknap 
Press, 1967), 2:588.
17Id. 588-589.
18Id., 589, emphasis in original.
to his natural liberty, so it is with regard to his other 
natural rights.”19
Since government is made for man, and not man for 
government, it is the duty of government to serve man.  And 
that means protecting his natural rights.  Rights are not 
something to use as barter – the government protects us in 
return for the surrender of some of our rights.  Rather, 
good government protects and nourishes those rights.
The Founders wanted a government that protected and 
nourished natural rights, the rights -- in the words of the 
Declaration of Independence -- of life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness.  A good and wise government protects 
these rights, and since the British government did not do 
so, it was not a good and wise government.  The concern 
that people such as Samuel Adams and James Otis had over 
the indiscriminate searches scanctioned by writs of 
assistance was that they violated the rights to life, 
liberty and property.
19Id, 588.
The Early State Constitutions
Eight of the early states had bills of rights,20 and 
all of these protected against general warrants.21    Four 
of the state bills of rights (those of Pennsylvania, 
Vermont, New Hampshire and Massachusetts) also contained 
statements against unreasonable searches and seizures; but 
the wording was such, as Nelson Lasson points out, that it 
is clear that the unreasonable search or seizure thus 
targeted is the one conducted by a general warrant.22  The 
20By early states I mean the original thirteen and 
Vermont. Vermont adopted a declaration of rights in 1777 
that included a declaration against general warrants 
(Section 11).  See Schwartz, The Bill of Rights: A 
Documentary History, 1:323; and Lasson, 82.
21Schwartz, The Great Rights of Mankind: A History of 
the Bill of Rights.  (Madison, WI: Madison House, 1992), 
90. Both Landynski (38) and Lasson (79-82) only mention 
seven states.  Both forget Delaware, which passed a 
declaration of rights in 1776.  Section 17 of that document 
condemns general warrants.  See Schwartz, The Bill of 
Rights: A Documentary History, 1:278.
2281, n.10.  For example, the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights of 1780 (Part 1, Article 14), which is very close 
to the wording of the Fourth Amendment (see Landynski, 38
and Lasson, 82), states that "Every subject has a right to 
be secure from all unreasonable searches, and seizures of 
his person, his houses, his papers, and all his 
possessions.  All warrants, therefore, are contrary to this 
right, if the cause or foundation of them be not previously 
supported by oath or affirmation; and if the order in the 
warrant to a civil officer, to make search in suspected 
places, or to arrest one or more suspected persons, or to 
first constitutional guarantee against general warrants was 
found in Section 10 of the June 12, 1776 Virginia 
Declaration of Rights:
That general warrants, whereby any officer or 
messenger may be commanded to search suspected 
places without evidence of a fact committed, or 
to seize any person or persons not named, or 
whose offence is not particularly described and 
supported by evidence, are grievous and 
oppressive, and ought not to be granted.23
This Declaration of Rights, which is typical of the other 
state constitution’s statements on search and seizure, 
condemns general warrants because they allow a person's 
property or person to be invaded without the support of 
evidence.  They in effect allow anyone's property or person 
to be searched and seized.  These warrants are 
indiscriminate, and as such they infringe upon a person’s 
natural right to liberty and property.  It is also 
important to note that the complaint in the Virginia 
Declaration of Rights is directed against general warrants. 
All searches, even warrantless searches under some 
circumstances, are not condemned.  It is the indiscriminate 
searches under the authority, and hence protection, of 
general warrants that are prohibited.                        
seize their property, be not accompanied with a special 
designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest, or 
seizure: and no warrant ought to be issued but in cases, 
and with formalities, prescribed by the laws."  Kurland and 
Lerner 5:237.  Emphasis added.
23Kurland and Lerner, 5:237.
Search and Seizure and the Ratification of the Constitution
General warrants were also an issue in the debate over 
the ratification of the U.S. Constitution.  Many of the 
opponents of the original Constitution were concerned that 
it lacked a bill of rights. Samuel Bryan, in the 
Antifederalist essay "Centinel I," argued that the 
Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention would decide the fate of 
the liberties of Pennsylvanians.  Ratifying the proposed 
new Constitution would be a mistake, he claimed, because it 
would set up a permanent aristocracy and did not protect 
the liberties of the citizens.  Under the Pennsylvania 
Constitution one was protected against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, but under the Constitution one's 
house would no longer be one's castle, and one's person and 
property would not be held free from general warrants.24
The "Letter #4 from a Federal Farmer,” argued that a 
federal bill of rights was needed to protect, among other 
essential rights, the "freedom from hasty and unreasonable 
search warrants, warrants not founded on oath, and not 
24[Samuel Bryan] "Centinel" I, in Debates on the 
Constitution ed. by Bernard Bailyn.  (New York: The Library 
of America, 1993), 1:52-53.    
issued with due caution, for searching and seizing men's 
papers, property, and persons."25   At the Pennsylvania 
Ratifying Convention Robert Whitehill proposed a series of 
amendments to the federal Constitution.  Among those 
amendments was one that stated that "warrants unsupported 
by evidence . . . are grievous and oppressive, and shall 
not be granted either by the magistrates of the federal 
government or others."26   The New York, Maryland, Virginia 
and North Carolina conventions all passed resolutions 
urging that a bill of rights be added to the federal 
Constitution, and that the bill of rights contain 
prohibitions against general warrants.27  The Founding 
generation considered general warrants breaches of the 
natural rights of man, and wanted to make sure that the new 
federal government did not make use of them.  
While all the men cited above were Antifederalists, I 
do not mean to imply that only the Antifederalists were 
worried about general warrants.  The supporters of the 
Constitution did not complain of a lack of a specific 
prohibition against general warrants because they favored 
these warrants. Rather, they thought a bill of rights was 
25
"Letters from the Federal Farmer, #4" in Debates,
1:279.
26In Bailyn, 1:872.
27Id., 2:538; 2:554; 2:560; 2:567.
unnecessary and harmful.  They thought, to paraphrase 
Alexander Hamilton in Federalist Paper 84, that the 
Constitution itself was a bill of rights, and as such 
protected the people's natural rights through the 
mechanisms of separation of powers, checks and balances, 
and the federal system with its explicit delegation of 
authority to the national government.  A bill of rights was 
a mere “parchment barrier,” worth only the paper it was 
written on, and the inclusion of a bill of rights in the 
constitution might suggest that the rights listed were the 
only rights the people had, and so imply that the federal 
government had more power than it really should.
The Fourth Amendment
Nevertheless, soon after the first Congress convened 
in 1789, Congressman James Madison introduced his proposed 
amendments to the Constitution -- amendments that would 
create a federal bill of rights.  One proposed amendment 
stated that: 
The rights of the people to be secured in their 
persons; their houses, their papers, and their 
other property, from all unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated by warrants 
issued without probable cause, supported by oath 
or affirmation, or not particularly describing 
the places to be searched, or the persons or 
things to be seized.28
Madison's proposed amendment is one flowing statement.  It 
simply says that the rights of the people to be secure in 
their persons and homes shall not be violated by warrants 
issued without cause, i.e., general warrants.  It is quite 
clear that general warrants are the mischief being aimed at 
here. The final version29 splits the amendment into two 
clauses30 -- the reasonableness clause, which states that 
all searches must be reasonable, and the warrant clause, 
which delineates the procedures a government official must 
follow in obtaining a proper warrant.  How are the two 
clauses related?  I have already indicated that the 
colonists’ complaints were directed towards general 
28Robert A. Goldwin, "Congressman Madison Proposes 
Amendments to the Constitution," The Framers and 
Fundamental Rights, ed. Robert A. Licht (Washington, DC: 
AEI Press, 1991), 78.
29
"The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
30Lasson, 100-103, explains how this happened.  
Congressman Benson, who was chairman of the committee 
appointed to arrange the amendments, made a motion on the 
House floor that the words "by warrants issuing" be 
stricken and replaced with the phrase "and no warrants 
shall issue."  The House voted down this proposed change, 
but in committee afterwards Benson apparently substituted 
his own words for the House approved version.  It is 
Benson's version that was later approved by the Senate and 
ratified by the states and is the Fourth Amendment of 
today.   I can find no explanation from Benson or a 
contemporary for this change in the wording.  Also see 
Kurland and Lerner, 5:237.
warrants, not warrantless searches.  Their argument was not 
that all searches were wrong, but that indiscriminate 
searches violated the natural rights to liberty and 
property, if not life, by assuming that the state could 
search and seize at will.  
The Fourth Amendment was aimed not at limiting all 
warrantless searches, but rather indiscriminate ones. The 
Founders stipulate that government officials must appear 
before a judge and demonstrate probable cause to search 
before invading someone’s property, but they did not 
condemn warrantless searches in public areas, of property
and persons, as long as there was cause.  Indeed, many 
warrantless searches took place at the time of the Founding 
and for many years thereafter.31  This is especially true 
for searches incident to arrest.32
Federal Search and Seizure Case Law
The Fourth Amendment case law at the federal level is 
sparse prior to the Twentieth Century.   Congress passed a 
few statutes dealing with searches and seizures, usually --
but not exclusively -- in customs cases; but very few of 
the laws (many of which I will discuss later) were 
31See pp.50-60 below for some typical examples.  Also, 
there were many federal cases involving customs laws.  See 
Harris, 30-34.
32Taylor, 45.         
challenged in the Supreme Court. Congress exercised 
limited criminal jurisdiction.  Crime was considered a 
local matter to be handled by the states as part of their 
police power.33 Only one Fourth Amendment case, Ex Parte 
Burford involved an improperly issued warrant.34
Of the Fourth Amendment cases the Supreme Court did 
hear, Locke v. United States35 deserves comment.  Locke is 
important because here John Marshall gives his famous 
definition of probable cause. He states,
that the term 'probable cause,' according to its 
usual acceptation, means less than evidence which 
would justify condemnation; and, in all cases of 
seizure, has a fixed and a well-known meaning.  
It imports a seizure made under circumstances 
that warrant suspicion.  In this, its legal 
sense, the court must understand the term to have 
been used by Congress.36
Probable cause does not require enough evidence to convict, 
but simply enough to provide reasonable suspicion.  In 
fact, the terms probable and reasonable cause at the time 
of the Founding “meant ‘probable cause to suspect.’”37  The 
clear implication is that the government cannot search and 
33Lasson, 106.
343 Cranch, 448, 1806.
357 Cranch, 339, 1813.
36Id., 367.
37Harris, 34; quoting Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch 170, 
176 (1804).
seize at its own fancy; there must be some suspicion to 
search and seize.  
State Case Law
Because of the paucity of search and seizure cases at 
the federal level in the early days of the republic, it is 
important to turn to state cases to understand the beliefs 
of early Americans on the issue of search and seizure.   
One of the most important cases involves a seizure.  In 
Wakely v. Hart,38 a case brought before the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, Wakely appealed his arrest and subsequent 
conviction on the charge of larceny.   He had been arrested 
without a warrant and taken to jail where the stolen item, 
a watch, was found on his person.39   Wakely contested his 
arrest because it violated the Pennsylvania Constitution’s 
warrant requirement, and he sued for trespass and assault 
and battery. The court rejected his appeal and ruled for 
the defendant, Hart.   In delivering the opinion of the 
court Chief Justice Tilghman said that the Pennsylvania 
386 Binnery 316 [PA 1814].
39Wakely, 316.
Constitution’s warrant clause is aimed at general warrants 
and nowhere prohibits an arrest without a warrant:
The provisions of this section (Pa. Con. art. 9, 
sec.7), so far as concerns warrants, only guard 
against their abuse by issuing them without 
cause, or in so general and vague a form, as may 
put it in the power of the officers who execute 
them to harass innocent persons under pretence of 
suspicion: for if general warrants are allowed, 
it must be left to the discretion of the officer, 
on what persons or things they are to be 
executed.  But it is nowhere said, that there 
shall be no arrest without warrant.  To have said 
so would have endangered the safety of society.40
The warrant clause in question, then, according to 
Tilghman, is not an endorsement of warrants, but a 
limitation on them.  To argue otherwise, by insisting that 
all arrests must be made with a warrant, endangers rather 
than protects the innocent.  All of society is endangered 
when the guilty go free.  The felon who is caught red-
handed, who is seen committing a crime, may be arrested and 
searched without a warrant.  He must be arrested on the 
spot or he may escape – and possibly commit another crime.  
40Wakely, 318; emphasis added.
41Wakely, 318-319.  As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, it was at his peril because if the search did not 
turn up evidence, the person conducting the search could be 
sued for damages.
Tilghman further argues that if a person is not seen, but 
is known by other means to have committed a felony, the 
person may be pursued with or without a warrant.  Even a 
private person may arrest, at his peril, a felon on 
probable cause of suspicion, with or without a warrant.41
The criminal suspect must be convicted, or the seizure is 
not justified and the private individual is liable for 
damages even if he had probable cause for the seizure.  The 
officer, on the other hand, is justified by probable 
cause.42  These above-stated points are principles of common 
42Wakely does not mention officer justification, but 
obviously that is what the court means, for why else 
specify justification for private individuals only?   For 
officer justification see Rohan v. Sawin, 59 Mass. 281, 
284-285 (1850); Reuck v. McGregor, 32 NJL 70, 74 (1866); 
Johnson v. State, 30 GA 426, 430 (1860).   The Georgia 
court in Johnson quotes no less than the famed English 
common law commentator Matthew Hale to back up its argument 
for officer justification for a warrantless arrest based on 
probable cause:
“by virtue of his office, empowered by law, to 
arrest felons, or those that are suspected of 
felony,  and that before conviction and also 
before indictment.  And these are under greater 
protection of  the law, in execution of this part 
of their office, upon these two accounts:
“1. Because they are persons more eminently 
trusted by the law, as in many other incidents to 
their office, so in this.
law, Tilghman says, and were not meant to be changed by the 
warrant clause of the constitution:
The whole section (Pa. Con. Art. 9, sec. 7) 
indeed, was nothing more than an affirmance of 
the common law, for general warrants have been 
decided to be illegal; but as the practice of 
issuing them had been ancient, the abuses great 
and the decisions against them only of modern 
date, agitation occasioned by the discussion of 
this important question had scarcely subsided, 
and it was thought prudent to enter a solemn veto
against this powerful engine of despotism.43
On the other hand, Tilghman clearly states that the 
purpose of the amendment is to prevent indiscriminate 
searches and seizures.  The purpose is to prevent the 
harassment of “innocent persons under the pretence of 
suspicion.”  General warrants infuriated the Founders 
because they allowed such indiscriminate searches.  Indeed, 
the Founding generation was so concerned about these 
general warrants that they enumerated in the federal and 
many state constitutions prohibitions against these 
"engines of despotism."
Congressional Search and Seizure Statutes
Another way of establishing the original understanding 
“2. Because they are, by law, punishable, if they 
neglect their duty in it.“…these officers, that 
are thus entrusted, may without any other warrant
but from themselves, arrest felons and those that 
are probably suspected of felonies;…” 
2 Hale’s Pleas of the Crown, 85, 86 and 1 East P. C. 301; 
quoted in Johnson v. State, 430-431.
43Wakely, 319, emphasis in original.
of the Fourth Amendment is to look at the laws the early 
Congresses passed concerning search and seizure.  Most of 
these laws, like the ones involved in Sailly and Jones,
concerned customs.  The same Congress that proposed what 
eventually became the Fourth Amendment passed three customs 
acts that bear on our question.  The first, The Collections 
Act of 1789, empowers federal officers to search for goods 
imported into the United States without duty:
. . . every collector naval officer and surveyor, 
. . . shall have full power and authority, to 
enter any ship or vessel, in which they shall 
have reason to suspect any goods, wares or 
merchandise subject to duty shall be concealed; 
and therein to search for, seize, and secure any 
such goods, wares or merchandise; and if they 
shall have cause to suspect a concealment 
thereof, in any particular dwelling-house, store, 
building, or other place, they . . . upon 
application on oath or affirmation to any justice 
of the peace, be entitled to a warrant to enter 
such house, store, or other place (in the day 
time only) and there to search for such goods, 
and if any shall be found, to seize and secure 
the same for trial; . . . . 44
The officers can search ships and vessels without a warrant 
if they have “reason to suspect” such a ship or vessel 
contains contraband goods.  The authors of this act 
consider such a warrantless search reasonable.  However, 
even here the officers must have reasonable suspicion to 
search.  They cannot just search a ship or vessel 
arbitrarily.    Notice, when it comes to homes, stores or
any particular buildings the officer must go before a 
44Collections Act, 1 Stat. 29, 43 (1789).
justice of the peace, give an oath or affirmation and 
secure a warrant.  The members of this First Congress 
obviously did not consider a warrant necessary for all 
searches; but also they believed that private buildings 
were entitled to extra protection from government searches.  
To search these private buildings a warrant was needed.45
As James Etienne Viator has pointed out, the 
Collection Act became law less than a month before Madison 
proposed his search and seizure amendment to the U. S. 
Constitution. The same Congress that proposed the Fourth 
Amendment passed more than one act that allowed warrantless 
searches outside of buildings, but required a warrant to 
search buildings:  
Hence, because the same legislators were busy
working on both proposals, it is not unreasonable 
to assume that the sorts of searches detailed in 
the Collection Act provide persuasive evidence of 
45The importance of the First Congress can not be over-
emphasized.  Its decisions have long been given special 
importance because it came into session a mere two years 
after the Constitutional Convention, because many of its 
members were delegates to the Constitutional Convention, 
and because it set the precedents for future Congresses.  
Indeed the Supreme Court has said, “early congressional 
enactments ‘provide ‘contemporaneous and weighty evidence’ 
of the Constitution’s meaning.’   Such ‘contemporaneous 
legislative exposition of the Constitution . . .. , 
acquiesced in for a long term of years, fixes the 
construction to be given its provisions.’” Printz v. United 
States (117 S. Ct. 2367, 1997) (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 
478 U.S. 714, 723-724 (1986) and Marsh v. Chambers, 463 
U.S. 783, 790 (1983), and Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 
52, 175 (1926)).
46James Etienne Viator, “The Fourth Amendment in the 
Nineteenth Century,” in Hickok, 175.
what search and seizure techniques were 
considered to be reasonable within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment."46
Viator nicely explains the distinction between searches of 
buildings and other searches found in the Collection Act of 
1789: 
...the Collection Act of 1789, therefore, should 
be enough in and of itself to refute anyone who 
argues that, at least by the original 
understanding, the reasonableness clause of the 
Fourth Amendment should be read in tandem with 
the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment to 
declare that the only reasonable searches 
countenanced by the Fourth Amendment's 
congressional enactors were those proceeded under 
a warrant . . . the Collection Act paid homage to 
the traditional English axiom that "a man's home 
is his castle" by providing that any search of a 
building -- and, notice, not just a house but a 
store or other building -- was to proceed under a 
warrant given on oath or affirmation and 
particularly describing the location to be 
searched.47
The passage of the Collection Act by the First Congress 
argues against the position of Landynski and others that 
the Fourth Amendment allows only searches conducted by a 
warrant.  As Viator correctly emphasizes, the Collection 
Act did not give special protection to homes, but provided 
protection to all privately owned buildings.48
The second act I want to consider is An Act Further to 
Provide for the Collection of Duties (3 Stat. 231, 1815).  
47Ibid.
48Also see Harris, 29; Lasson, 125-126.
This act is similar to the first act described.  It 
requires a search warrant to search any house, store or 
other building for goods unlawfully imported into the 
United States. It provides for warrantless searches outside 
of buildings:
. . . it shall be lawful for any collector, naval 
officer, surveyor, or inspector of the customs . 
. . to stop, search, and examine any carriage or 
vehicle, of any kind whatsoever, and to stop any 
person traveling on foot, or beast of burden, on 
which he shall suspect there be any goods, wares, 
or merchandise, which are subject to duty, or 
which shall have been introduced into the United 
States in any manner contrary to law; and if such 
officer find any goods, wares, or merchandise, on 
any such carriage, vehicle, person travelling on 
foot, or beast of burden, which he shall have 
probable cause to believe are subject to duty, or 
shall have been unlawfully introduced into the 
United States, he shall seize and secure the same 
for trial.49
In this statute the customs officer is only allowed to 
seize items if there is probable cause to suspect that the 
items have been illegally imported into the United States.  
Nevertheless, when it comes to buildings a warrant is 
required for a search:
. . . if any of the said officers of the customs 
shall suspect that any goods . . . which are 
subject to duty, . . . are concealed in any 
particular dwelling house, store, or other 
building, he shall, upon proper application, on 
oath, to any judge or justice of the peace, be 
entitled to a warrant, directed to such officer, 
who is hereby authorized  to serve same, to enter 
such house, store, or other building, in day time 
49An Act Further to Provide for the Collection of 
Duties, 3 Stat. 231, 232 (1815).
only, and here to search and examine whether 
there are any goods, . . . which are subject to 
duty. . . . 50
Again, we see a double standard.  Buildings, including 
homes and stores, receive extra protection under the 
statute.  And it is not only homes, but also places of 
business, stores, that receive the extra protection of a 
warrant requirement.     
Following this clause requiring a warrant to search a 
Building, Congress reiterates that a warrant is not to be 
required to search in vehicles or public areas:
Provided always, That the necessity of a search 
warrant, arising under this act, shall in no case 
be considered as applicable to any carriage, 
wagon, cart sleigh, vessel, boat, or other 
vehicle, of whatever form or construction, 
employed as a medium of transportation, or to 
packages on any animal or animals, or carried by 
man on foot.51
Congress feels so strongly about the right to search 
vehicles and persons on foot without a warrant that it adds 
a clause to this section of the statute specifically 
stating that although all searches in buildings are to be 
conducted by warrants, this should not be interpreted to 
mean that warrants are required for searches in vehicles or 
public areas.  There could be no clearer evidence that the 
early Americans did not believe that the Fourth Amendment 
set out an absolute warrant requirement.  The Fourth 
50Ibid.
51Ibid., emphasis in original.
Amendment obviously was not meant by the early generations 
to require a warrant in all situations.52
Conclusion
Indianapolis v. Edmond decision illustrates a 
troubling propensity of the twentieth-century Court.  The 
Court jealously guards (sometimes to the point of creating 
new rights) the protections available to criminal suspects; 
while at the same time is indifferent to the violations of 
the constitutional rights of law-abiding citizens.   This 
52For further example of acts that differentiate 
between searches on one’s premises and outside of those 
premises, see An Act to Provide more Effectually for the 
Collection of Merchandise Imported into the United States 
and of the Duties Imposed by Law on Goods, Wares and on 
Tonnage of Ships or Vessels (1 Stat. 145, sections 48 and 
51) and Duty Collection Act (1 Stat. 627, sections 66-70).  
Cf. An Act to Reduce Internal Taxation and to Amend an Act 
Entitled An Act to Provide Internal Revenue to Support the 
Government, to Pay Interest on the Public Debt and for 
other Purposes(14 Stat. 98, section 15; which requires a 
revenue officer to obtain a search warrant before searching 
premises that are being used to commit fraud on the United 
States) with An Act for Enrolling and Licensing Ships or 
Vessels to be Employed in the Coasting Trade, and 
Fisheries, and for Regulating the Same (1 Stat. 305, 
section 27, which allows the officer to search any ship or 
vessel without a warrant). Other examples of acts that 
require warrants to search premises are: An Act to Regulate 
the Disposition of the Proceeds of Fines, Penalties, and 
Forfeitures Incurred under Laws Relating to the Customs and 
for other Purposes (14 Stat. 546), An Act to Amend Section 
Three-thousand and Sixty-six of the Revised Statutes of the 
United States, in Relation to the Authority of Search 
Warrants (22 Stat. 49), the Act of 20 February 1865 (13 
Stat. 441, Sec. 3), and the Act of 10 February 1891 (26 
Stat. 742, Sec. 5).  
is particularly true in the Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence.  The Court has strengthened the protections 
of criminal suspects, for example, disallowing warrantless 
searches based on probable cause in public areas (roadways, 
sidewalks, etc.) although such searches took place at the 
time of the Founding.53 At the same time, the Court allows 
the government a to obtain a warrant to search commercial 
property (and sometimes homes) without demonstrating 
probable cause probable cause although the Fourth Amendment 
clearly requires a warrant.54 Edmond continues this 
53 See United States v. Chadwick (433 U. S. 1, 1977), 
United States v. Ross (456 U. S. 798, 1948), Arkansas v. 
Sanders (442 U. S. 616, 1979), California v. Acevedo (111 
S. Ct. 1982, 1991). (One might argue that after Acevedo 
searches of vehicles on public roads is returned to the 
original standard by permitting warrantless searches based 
on probable cause.  This is true but I note Justice 
Scalia’s comment in his concurring opinion:
I agree with the dissent that it is 
anomalous for a briefcase to be protected
By the “general requirement” of a prior 
warrant when it is being carried along the 
street, but for that same briefcase to 
become unprotected as soon as it is carried 
into an automobile.  On the other hand, I 
agree with the Court that it would be 
anomalous for a locked compartment in an 
automobile to be unprotected by the “general 
requirement” of a prior warrant, but for an 
unlocked briefcase within the automobile to 
be protected.  I join in the judgement of 
the Court because I think its holding is 
more faithful to the text and tradition of 
the Fourth Amendment, and if these anomalies 
in our jurisprudence are ever to be 
eliminated that is the direction in which we 
should travel.  (Acevedo, 1992) 
54 Text of warrant clause; For representative cases see: 
Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc. (426 U. S. 307, 1978), Donovan 
tendency. Indeed, in Edmond the Court cites Camera v. 
Municipal Court55 (which allowed a suspicionless inspection 
of a home, and Burger v. New York56 (which allowed a
suspicionless search of a junkyard). After Edmond, 
suspicionless stops of vehicles will be permissible where 
the primary purpose of the search is not criminal, while 
stops of vehicles of criminal suspects, must be based on 
probable cause. In other words, it is permissible to harass 
and inconvenience presumably law-abiding citizens with car 
stops, but if the stop concerns a criminal matter, then 
suspicion is required.  Criminal suspects are awarded more 
protection than law-abiding citizens. 
v. Dewey (452 U. S. 594, 1981), Colonnade v. United States 
(397 U. S. 72, 1970), United States v. Bislow (406 U. S. 
31, 1972).
55387 U. S. 523 (1967).
56New York v. Burger, 482 U. S. 691 (1987).

